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The Shimabara Rebellion has been studied throughout history by historians of East Asia. Originally conceived
by both Japanese and Western scholars as a religious revolt against the anti-Christian Tokugawa government,
later scholars contended that the Rebellion was a demonstration by the mistreated and impoverished and only
tacitly related to Christian influences. This paper sets out to build on that narrative and to show the
connection between the Christian resistance to the Tokugawa government and the movement of
impoverished and desperate peasants, pushed to the brink of existence. Furthermore, this paper hopes to
explore the goals of the Rebellion and establish the Shimabara Rebellion within the context of other rebellions
during the Tokugawa era.
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The Desperate Rebels of Shimabara: 
The Economic and Political Persecutions 
and the Tradition of Peasant Revolt 
By 
Jake Farias  
~      ~ 
 
The Shimabara Rebellion from 1637 to 1638 remains one 
of the most historically divisive events in Japanese early modern 
history.  The Rebellion threw the Shimabara and Amakusa 
provinces on the far south of Japanese islands into outright revolt 
against their lords, and, later, against the army of the shogunate 
itself.  The cause of the Rebellion remains a popular 
historiographical debate into the modern day.  Some contend that 
the sizeable, if still minority, population of Japanese Christians in 
these distant provinces revolted in order to overthrow a 
government whose public policy included the persecution, torture, 
and execution of Christians.  Others argue that economic 
oppression forced the peasants into revolt against irresponsible 
daimyo, or local lords, with the Christian element being 
overplayed in historical records.  Neither of these interpretations 
fully captures the nature of the Shimabara Rebellion.  Tokugawa 
Japan, even after the Rebellion, maintained a long tradition of 
peasant resistance to the domination by the daimyo through 
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petitions, inactivity, and even outright violence.  Economic 
hardship and political persecution undoubtedly pressured peasants 
into rebellion against their lords in Shimabara and Amakusa.  
However, Christian influences in these regions tied together the 
revolt of farmers, unemployed soldiers, and other classes.  The 
Shimabara Rebellion was not a peasants’ revolt against unjust 
taxation or a Christian uprising.  The Rebellion was the last 
measure of a desperate people, pushed together by a common 
economic suffering and held together by a common culture 
marked, but not consumed, by Japanese Christianity.  After the 
Rebellion, the Tokugawa shogunate’s persecution of Christianity 
was a concentrated effort to cut or replace these cultural and 
religious ties in order to end the threat of any future powerful and 
unified revolts.  The shogunate’s reaction reveals how they 
recognized the multiple causes of the Rebellion and used the 
experience to prevent future insurrections. 
In order to properly understand how the Shimabara arose, 
historians must be aware not just of the economic and religious 
environment, but also of the common practices of the peasant 
class.  Although the Tokugawa era was characterized by 
administrative and government domination, the chonin, or middle 
to lower classes, still maintained some ability to resist unilateral 
domination by their daimyo.  Peasants eventually submitted to 
social immobility and high taxes from their lords; however, they 
were still able to influence local policy.  Often, in instances of bad 
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farming or famine, peasants requested exemption or lowering of 
the tax rate.185 While the daimyo had no legal obligation to act on 
these peasant demands, their acceptance hinted at a local 
relationship more flexible than the national tax-collecting policy.  
Despite the heavy cost demands of the upkeep of estate, personal 
castle, and lavish lifestyle, daimyo were more willing to negotiate 
with peasants than to risk a costly revolt.  Often these appeals were 
conducted through village headmen and the wealthy farming 
families who sought to retain a greater amount of surplus crop.186  
However, increased tax burdens most heavily affected the poorer 
farming families, who could be driven to starvation in years of bad 
harvest.  As a result, some of these poor farmers threatened to 
abandon their land, leaving the domain’s agricultural base without 
its primary labor force.  In the pursuit for concessions, the 
headsman used typical honorifics and appeals to their “benevolent 
lordship,” laced with dissatisfaction over the lord’s administration.  
In extreme cases, peasant classes chanced open revolt when their 
daimyo ignored petitions and refused any concessions.  Only 
twenty years after the bloody Shimabara Rebellion, peasants under 
the Kurume administration in southern Japan violently revolted 
when their lord refused to lower “unheard of taxes” and every 
                                                          
185 Donald Burton, “Peasant Movements in Early Tokugawa Japan,” Peasant 
Studies, 8, no. 3 (Summer 1979), accessed February 20, 2015, 62.  Historical 
Abstracts. 
186 Ibid., 65. 
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demand by the peasants.187 
As a result, typically the daimyo and the shogunate opted to 
appease the peasant population instead of having to crush outright 
rebellion.188  Daimyo that lost control over their peasant population 
were often replaced and dishonored by their administrative failure.  
Through this policy of mutual responsibility, the chief concerns of 
the daimyo shifted from collecting as much as possible from the 
peasant population to maintaining peace and order in their domain.  
Although the exploitation of peasants through poll taxes, 
agricultural taxes, and more continued, daimyo made concessions 
and tax breaks to avoid the humiliation of a revolt.  The complicity 
of the law was better assured when the peasants respected their 
lord and believed they would receive fair treatment.  For example, 
even after the brutally repressed Shimabara Rebellion, peasants hid 
their rice from tax collectors in Bizan.189  Efficient tax collection 
was easier and better guaranteed through appeasement, not force.  
Tokugawa era daimyo exploited the peasantry, but the peasantry 
retained an agency to defy absolute domination. 
                                                          
187 Ibid.,67. 
188 Daimyo and the shogunate maintained a feudal relationship not unlike that of 
kings and lords in Europe.  The shogunate was the ultimate military and political 
authority.  The shogun and his advisors directed military operations on a grand 
scale and controlled national legislature.  The daimyo received their lands by the 
authority of the shogun and, as such, were subservient to his demands and 
interests.  They were expected to maintain order in their territory, collect taxes 
for the shogunate, and provide grand demonstrations of loyalty to the shogun 
through parades to the capitol of Edo. 
189 Burton, “Peasant Movements,” 67. 
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Many historians have discussed the Shimabara Rebellion in 
detail, primarily focusing on the causes of the revolt.  Older 
research tended to place the blame on the harsh anti-Christian 
policies enacted by the daimyo.  Neil Fujita and Joseph Sebes both 
attributed the rebellion as an outburst of persecuted Japanese 
Christians, joined by hidden Christians who had been “forced to 
apostatize” through torture and intimidation. 190   Japanese 
Christians were a significant minority in southern Japan.  
Originally, daimyo had forced their peasantry to convert to 
Christianity in order to attract European ships and the goods they 
carried, particularly guns.  Although the demand for guns 
significantly lessened once the Tokugawa shogunate stiffened its 
control over the nation, many of the peasants remained committed 
to their newfound religion.  Reports of the Rebellion, from 
European and Japanese sources, detailed the rebels’ use of 
Christian symbols and banners.  However, Fujita and Sebes’ theory 
relied on a much larger population of Japanese Christians than 
actually existed in Kyushu.  More realistically, modern historians 
relied on the tradition and accounts of peasant rebellions to explain 
the Rebellion. 191   Using research by historians such as Donald 
Burton and Geoffrey Parker, more recent narratives explained the 
                                                          
190 Joshua Sebes, “Christian Influences on the Shimabara Rebellion 1637-1638,” 
Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu, no. 48 (1978), 142.  Historical Abstracts. 
191 Fujita and Sebes are both authors and religious historians.  Although their 
research is valuable, their interpretation is skewed with an examination of the 
Shimabara Rebellion through a Christian lens. 
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Shimabara Rebellion as a peasants’ revolt against political injustice 
and unbearable taxation.  Geoffrey Gunn explicitly described this 
version of events as “refreshingly modern.”192  However, to simply 
disregard the well-documented Christian element of the Rebellion 
does not fully explore the origins of the Shimabara Rebellion, nor 
explain the harsh reprisals against Christianity following the 
Rebellion. 193   Recently, more historians have rejected both the 
Christian uprising and peasant revolt narratives, entertaining the 
idea that both elements substantially influenced the Rebellion.  
Ohashi Yukihiro, a younger and newer historian, even explored 
how the opposing narratives of the Shimabara Rebellion were 
developed by historians after concluding that multiple elements of 
social hierarchy and cohesion, religious persecution, and economic 
despotism made the Rebellion possible.  Ultimately, historians 
have increasingly accepted that there is no singular cause, and have 
begun to explore how the memory of the Shimabara Rebellion was 
created to simplify the historical narrative and foist the blame for 
civil unrest on the small minority of Japanese Christians. 
 In Shimabara and Amakusa, economic pressures were so 
dire as to require these methods of resistance.  Many peasants 
complained of heavy taxes and of difficulty living.  Wealthier 
                                                          
192 Geoffrey Gunn, “The Duarte Correa manuscript and the Shimabara 
Rebellion,” Crossroads, no. 6 (1998), 12.  Found in Crossroads Website. 
193 Burton, Parker, and Gunn are historians and professors focused on East Asia 
and Japan.  Their interpretation reflects the secularization of history and an 
attempt to fit the Shimabara Rebellion into a larger pattern of peasant rebellions. 
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farmers could not retain as much surplus and poor farmers risked 
starvation under the new Shimabara lord.194  The previous lord, 
who had also burdened the population with persecution of 
Christianity and heavy taxes, had died suddenly, leaving his 
inexperienced son to continue his unpopular policies.  Peasants in 
Amakusa suffered similarly and this heavy economic oppression 
irked many of the farmers, both wealthy and poor. 195   Duarte 
Correa, a Portuguese sea captain-turned-Jesuit, recorded that the 
peasants of Amakusa were forced to pay the annual tribute in 
wheat, rice, and barley as well as two additional imposts.  
Furthermore, Correa asserted that the peasantry was expected to 
serve the daimyo in every way possible, such as supplying 
firewood to their lord’s soldiers.196  While Correa’s testimony is 
steeped in bias, as a secret Catholic missionary, these claims 
leveled against the lords of Shimabara and Amakusa are supported 
by their inexperience and youth. 197   Additionally, extravagant 
spending by the daimyo was typically expected, from the expenses 
                                                          
194 Ohashi Yukihiro, trans. Martin Ramos, “The Revolt of Shimabara-
Amakusa,” Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies, no. 20 (2010), 74.  
Historical Abstracts. 
195 Gunn, “Duarte Correa,” 7. 
196 Ibid., 12. 
197 Correa, as a Portuguese Jesuit, looked to avoid placing the blame of the 
rebellion on Christianity itself.  Rather, he blamed the faulty administration of 
the daimyo in order to clear Christianity of most responsibility of the Rebellion.  
Ultimately, his efforts fell short as the Tokugawa bakufu cited the Rebellion as a 
major Christian uprising and banned Christianity from Japan.  Correa was later 
imprisoned for his Portuguese ethnicity and Christian faith in Nagasaki, tortured, 
and burned to death. 
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of sankin kotai to the costs of maintain their castle, dress, and other 
status symbols.198  Being inexperienced daimyo, these two lords 
may have been overwhelmed by their administrative and social 
duties and resorted to raising taxes to procure the appropriate 
funds.  However, through the eyes of the peasants, these daimyo 
openly exploited their peasant class in order to enhance their own 
personal wealth.  Most accounts claim that the Shimabara lord 
used most of the collected taxes in order to fund the building of his 
new Shimabara castle at the expense of the farming class.  
Furthermore, the lords punctuated these economic injustices with 
acts of political terror and torture.  Peasants unable to supply taxes 
were beaten, drowned, and killed on the administration’s orders.199  
These economic and political abuses created a highly volatile 
sentiment among the commoner classes, especially the farmers. 
 These economic and political injustices were compounded 
by the religious persecution enacted by both the state and local 
governments.  Since Toyotomi Hideoyoshi’s reign, the government 
had, at least on paper, opposed the expansion and continued 
presence of Christianity in Japan.  In 1587, Hideyoshi declared that 
any lord who wanted to become a “follower of the padres (priests)” 
of their own volition could do so and also convert their fief, only 
                                                          
198 Sankin kotai is the law of necessary expeditions to and prolonged stays at the 
shogunate’s castle in Edo.  The daimyo were expected to make this trip at least 
annually and maintain an impressive home worthy of their title.  The intention of 
sankin kotai was to keep daimyo from building too much personal wealth and to 
bring them close under the watchful eye of the shogunate. 
199 Ohashi, “Revolt of Shimabara-Amakusa,” 74. 
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prohibiting some of the wealthier and more influential fief owners 
from doing so. 200   However, in the same year, Hideyoshi also 
expelled the missionaries from Japan and denounced his vassals 
who had convinced the peasants of their fief to convert as well.201  
Christianity had first arrived in southern Japan in the mid 1500’s, 
brought in force by Portuguese missionaries and later by Christian 
Dutch and British merchant companies.  As evidenced in Samurai 
William, these Southern lords employed a number of methods to 
attract European trading company ships.202  Acting independently 
of the daimyo, some lords converted to Christianity to attract the 
European merchants to their cities, or at least provided Christian 
missionaries with access to the countryside and peasant population.  
Some peasants converted upon their lord’s conversion to 
Christianity while others were convinced by the preaching of the 
Christian priests.  Japanese Christians never became a majority in 
southern Japan, but did account for a sizeable minority of the 
population. 
Although Christianity was still, to some extent, prevalent in 
                                                          
200 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, “Limitation on the Propagation of Christianity, 1587,” 
in Japan: A Documentary History: The Dawn of History to the Late Tokugawa 
Period, ed. David Lu (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 196. 
201 Toyotomi Hideyoshi, “Expulsion of the Missionaries, 1587,” in Japan: A 
Documentary History: The Dawn of History to the Late Tokugawa Period, ed. 
David Lu (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 197. 
202 Giles Milton, Samurai William (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2002), 182. 
In the case of the British East India Company, King Foyne of Hirado 
demonstrated his hospitality in the form of food and prostitutes provided for the 
crew of the Clove.  King Foyne won over the British East India Company and 
Hirado became the location the English factory.  
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Kyushu in the early 1600’s under the first Tokugawa shogun, 
Tokugawa Ieyasu, the succeeding shoguns harshly condemned the 
foreign religion. 203   During the early Tokugawa shogunate, 
Christianity experienced a “dramatic decline,” likely due to the 
shogunate’s increasing alienation and restriction of European 
influences during the Edo period.204  Christianity was only truly 
valued for the trade, specifically guns, it brought in from European 
merchants; with the pacification of Japan under Tokugawa Ieyasu, 
there was a decreased demand for guns and a significant decreased 
value on trade with the European Christians.  Christian faith was 
considered a crime.  This policy was not entirely unique to 
Christianity, as unpopular Buddhist sects and families of disloyal 
retainers received similar treatment.  Regardless, hundreds of 
Christians were executed in Kyoto in 1619 and in Nagasaki in 
1622.205  Records of Christians being imprisoned, decapitated, and 
burned alive characterized the shogunate’s attitude towards 
Japanese Christians. 206  Even more graphic executions included 
crucifixion, water torture, mutilation, and “suspending the prisoner 
head down over a pit of excrement.”  Many of the Japanese 
Christians recanted to avoid punishment while others were driven 
                                                          
203 Ohashi, “Revolt of Shimabara-Amakusa,” 73. 
204 Peter Nosco, “Early Modernity and the State’s Policies toward Christianity in 
16th and 17th Century Japan,” Bulletin of Portuguese Japanese Studies, no. 7 
(2003), 12.  Historical Abstracts. 
205 Ibid., 12.  
206 Fujita, “Persecution by Tokugawa Bakufu,” in Japan’s Encounter with 
Christianity: the Catholic mission in pre-modern Japan (New York, NY: Paulist 
Press, 1991), 175-177. 
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into underground groups.207  The Tokugawa bakufu’s desire for 
control, stability, and order compelled it to attempt to quash 
Christianity.208  The Era of the Warring States, characterized by 
near constant civil war across Japan by competing warlords, was 
over and there was no longer any need for trade with the 
Europeans.  To emphasize the point, two years before the 
Shimabara Rebellion, the Tokugawa shogunate issued an edict 
barring the Catholic priests from Japan, demanding that its 
citizenry report any found padres, and promised to put to death any 
Japanese returning from overseas.209  Christianity had outstayed its 
welcome in Tokugawa Japan, as the bakufu sought to consolidate 
its control over its population’s personal and religious lives.  Zen 
Buddhism was becoming a national religion used to encourage 
loyalty and subservience among the peasantry and to reinforce 
Tokugawa authority instead of opposing it.210  In the eyes of the 
shogunate, Christianity had outlived its usefulness and had become 
a cause of disorder in the religious conflict it provoked. 
 At the local level, the Shimabara and Amakusa lords 
                                                          
207 Tetsuya Ohama, “Christianity in the Edo Period,” in A History of Japanese 
Religion, ed. Kazuo Kasahara, trans. Paul McCarthy and Gaynor Sekimori 
(Tokyo, Japan: Kosei Publishing Company, 2001), 437. 
208 The bakufu was the military and political government administrated by the 
Tokugawa shogun. 
209 Tokugawa Shogunate, “Excerpts from The Edict of 1653 Ordering the 
Closing of Japan: Addressed to the Joint Bugyo of Nagasaki,” in Japan: A 
Documentary History: The Dawn of History to the Late Tokugawa Period, ed. 
David Lu (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 221. 
210 Nosco, “Early Modernity,” 12-13. 
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engaged in the persecution of Christians in the same manner as the 
shogunate.  This process was very common in domains formerly 
controlled by Christian daimyo.211  In a later letter to shogunate 
forces, one rebel claimed that their only wish was to practice 
Christianity without repression.212  Although this demand was not 
universal for the Shimabara rebels, a significant percentage of 
Japanese Christians lived in constant fear of being arrested and 
executed for their religion.  The Shimabara and Amakusa 
repressions of Christianity worsened an already toxic relationship 
between the daimyo and their peasants. 
 This common suffering of the Shimabara and Amakusa 
peasants, both Christians and non-Christians, was pushed to a 
breaking point by 1637 CE.  The peasants of Shimabara revolted, 
attacking the lord’s tax officials and men.  The peasants, 
merchants, craftsmen, and unemployed soldiers of Amakusa 
followed, as joined the rebellion out of choice or force.  These 
rebels converged on Hara Castle to reform and organize, 
appointing the 16-year old Amakusa Shiro as their “leader.” 213  
                                                          
211 While many Southern lords had converted their fiefs to Christianity to garner 
European trade, many were replaced or forced out by the Tokugawa bakufu.  
The later non-Christian daimyo, eager to prove their loyalty to the Tokugawa 
shogunate, became unpopular in these regions because of their persecution of 
Christianity.  
212 Ohashi, “Revolt of Shimabara-Amakusa,” 74. 
213 In reality, it is much more likely that Shiro was more of a figurehead while 
the rebel ronin decided on tactics and war plans.  Shiro’s youth and the initial 
success of the rebellion imply that more experienced warriors planned the 
military aspect of the rebellion. 
121 
 
Hara Castle was besieged by Tokugawa forces but their initial 
attempts to crush the rebels failed.  After almost four months, the 
Tokugawa forces starved the rebels of food, resources, and 
ammunition.  Hara Castle fell and the Tokugawa forces 
exterminated almost all of the participating rebels.  After the 
massacre, the shogunate issued edicts expelling and banning all 
Europeans, except for the Dutch at Nagasaki, and reinforcing the 
outlaw of Christianity in Japan.  After the Rebellion, Christianity 
was affixed with a permanent stigma of violence, disorder, and 
disrespect for proper authority.  The Tokugawa shogunate issued 
propaganda portraying Christianity as impure and inappropriate 
while also promising rewards to those who reported Christian 
practitioners.214  Japanese Christians were forced underground to 
hide their religion and the Tokugawa shogunate eliminated 
Japanese Christianity as what they perceived as a threat. 
 Although historians like Fujita or Gunn argue whether 
economic or religious oppression was more significant in pushing 
the Tokugawa peasantry to revolt, the Rebellion was much more 
complicated.  The communities of Shimabara and Amakusa were 
tightly knit, tied together by a common culture.  Christianity had 
its largest base for support in southern Japan, and Japanese 
                                                          
214 Tokugawa Shogunate, “Excerpts from The Five-Household Group Laws 
from Shimo Sakurai Village (1640),” in Voices of Early Modern Japan: 
Contemporary Accounts of Daily Life during the Age of the Shoguns, ed. 
Constantine Vaporis (Oxford, England: Greenwood, 2012), 84. 
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Christians made up a significant percentage of the population.  
Although public acts of torture and execution were intended to 
horrify and scare the populace into submission, at the time, local 
daimyo could only safely employ it in moderation.  By overusing 
these methods, the daimyo pushed the population past the breaking 
point, to where they were convinced that they were more safe 
revolting than continuing under the daimyo’s rule.  Japanese 
Christians and non-Christian peasants were tied together by the 
communal need to survive.  In times of famine or bad harvests, the 
village headmen, regardless of their religion, campaigned for lower 
tax rates, tax breaks, and exemptions.  Regardless of their 
differences in religion, wealth, or social status, the peasantry pulled 
together in times of extreme despotism with the intention of 
forcing improvement in their standard of living.  In their struggle 
to survive, the agricultural base had created a community that 
relied on each other to demand concessions from the state 
authority. 
 Additionally, although only Christians were being 
persecuted for religious reasons, every member of the commoner 
class was being exploited economically and oppressed politically.  
In an effort to both help fund the reconstruction of Edo’s walls and 
to build his own Shimabara Castle, Shigemasa Matsukura, the new 
lord, imposed heavy taxes and developed strict penalties for the 
farmers who failed to provide.  Many of these taxes seem almost 
ridiculous to modern thinking, such as taxes for the death of a 
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family member.  Families unable to pay their taxes were starved, 
beaten, tortured, or killed.  The mothers and daughters of these 
families were sold into brothels.  Concessions were not 
forthcoming.215  The economic and political oppression unified the 
peasantry into a culture of suffering, one in which mutual 
dependence was essential. 
 Economic grievances played a significant role in the start 
of the Rebellion.  The unbearable taxes and system of punishments 
pushed the peasantry to desperate measures.  As the lifestyle 
became more and more untenable, the peasants turned to their own 
and implemented the only option left available to resist: open 
rebellion.  At its very least, revolt attracted the attention, and 
displeasure, of the shogunate.  In some ways, the peasant revolt 
can be interpreted as a Pyrrhic victory, mutually assured 
destruction for both the rebels and the daimyo.  In previous cases, 
daimyo were dishonored and removed from office as punishment 
for failing to maintain peace in their domain.  Political and 
economic despotism forced peasants to drastic actions.  The close 
bonds between the community, strengthened by a common culture 
and common “suffering,” assured that the rebels organized, 
mobilized, and, largely remained loyal to each other. 
 The Shimabara Rebellion was an incredibly costly 
challenge to Tokugawa authority.  The rebels raided armories, 
                                                          
215 Fujita, “Persecution,” 184. 
124 
 
killed Tokugawa soldiers, and forced a lengthy siege.  More 
importantly, the Rebellion embarrassed the bakufu; although the 
peasantry was incited against their daimyo, these commoners-in-
arms managed to occupy a castle, repulse, and kill trained 
military.216  In short, the Shimabara Rebellion was not a mistake 
the shogunate could allow to happen again.  To prevent another 
uprising of the similar nature, the Tokugawa shogunate devoted 
itself to the expulsion and elimination of Christianity in the 
domains.  By foisting the blame on the Japanese Christians, the 
shogunate could divide the communities in southern Japan where 
Christians were still a significant minority. 
 The Tokugawa shogunate employed a more developed and 
systematic persecution of Christians.  Propaganda was specifically 
designed to demonize the European Christian missionaries.  In one 
chapbook, the Christian “padre” is described more like a goblin 
than human, with the intention of taking over Japan. 217  These 
depictions were intended to scare Japanese away from interaction 
with Christianity and to create a connotation between Christianity 
and evil.  However, this propaganda piece also did much more.  
The Buddhist monk ultimately prevents the spread of the priest’s 
“screeching,” juxtaposing the wild and uncivilized image of the 
                                                          
216 Sebes, “Christian Influences on the Shimabara Rebellion,” 143. 
217 Unknown Authors, excerpts from Kirishitan Monogatari (1639), in Voices of 
Early Modern Japan: Contemporary Accounts of Daily Life during the Age of 
the Shoguns, ed. Constantine Vaporis (Oxford, England: Greenwood, 2012), 
202. 
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Christian padre with the calm wisdom and loyalty of the Buddhist 
monk.  By denigrating Christianity, this excerpt elevates Zen 
Buddhism which was quickly becoming the Tokugawa’s influence 
on religion.  Kirishitan also legitimized the reprisals of the 
shogunate against Christianity; in this text, the shogun has the 
moral right to destroy their temples and punish those that remain 
Christian. 218  The shogunate certainly exercised this right more 
frequently and publicly after the rebellion.  While the previous 
executions had been sporadic and scattered, the shogunate 
enforced stricter laws ordering the population to report Japanese 
Christians.  One set of Household Laws from 1640 includes 
numerous charges to investigate and report any Christian activities.  
All villagers were also required to report to the “pertinent temple,” 
as Zen Buddhist temples took over the responsibility of ensuring 
the Tokugawa shogunate’s control over its citizens’ religions.  
Tokugawa officials assumed these laws would be followed, 
because if Christians were discovered by these officials, the entire 
village would be punished.219  One edict ordered by the Tokugawa 
senior counselors in 1639 captures the spirit of this policy: 
 
With regard to those who believe in 
Christianity, you are aware that there 
is a proscription, and thus knowing, 
you are not permitted to allow padres 
                                                          
218 Unknown Authors, “Kirishitan Monogatari,” 203. 
219 Tokugawa Shogunate, “Excerpts from The Five-Household Group Laws”, 
84. 
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and those who believe in their 
teachings to come aboard your ships.  
If there is any violation, all of you 
who are aboard will be considered 
culpable.  If there is anyone who 
hides the fact that he is a Christian 
and boards your ship, you may report 
it to us.  A substantial reward will be 
given to you for this information.220 
 
This memorandum was addressed to Chinese and Dutch ships.  
The bakufu clarified that foreigners could be Christian as long as 
they did not propagate. However, this edict demonstrates the 
bakufu’s main tool in rooting out Christianity was not officials or 
even Buddhist temples but the civilian population itself.  The threat 
of punishment for failing to report Christians compelled the non-
Christian population to take an active role in searching out 
Christians within their own village or town.  The promise of 
reward made compliance even more appealing. 
The concept that everyone would suffer for the religious 
beliefs on one individual drove a wedge between Japanese 
Christians and non-Christians.  These Group Laws, and the 
promised reprisals for disobeying them, severed the cultural ties 
and communal spirit that had united the Shimabara and Amakusa 
peasants regardless of religion.  With these laws, commoners had 
to fear their neighbor, not support them.  Edicts like these helped 
                                                          
220 Tokugawa Shogunate, “Exclusion of the Portuguese (1939),” in Voices of 
Early Modern Japan: Contemporary Accounts of Daily Life during the Age of 
the Shoguns, ed. Constantine Vaporis (Oxford, England: Greenwood, 2012), 97. 
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the Tokugawa government root out Christianity−and prevent the 
disorder it could create−but also cut any ties of trust or fellowship 
that could unite peasant families in a revolt. 
 However, the Tokugawa shogunate also understood the role 
corrupt and incompetent daimyo played in inciting the Shimabara 
Rebellion.  Both Matsukura and Katataka were instructed to end 
their lives in penance for failing to keep the peace.  Future daimyo 
were more incentivized to treat their peasants well, rather than risk 
the humiliation of a revolt. 221   In this way, the shogunate 
discouraged corruption and injustice, based on its risks of agitating 
the populace and creating the necessary dissatisfaction for a revolt.  
Although Group Laws kept villages divided and fearful of one 
another, too much economic and political despotism would still 
drive the peasantry together.  As one abbot Kodo told the lord of 
Kurume, cornered rats will even “bite the cat when driven to 
extremity.”222  Kodo’s statement, whether an invention of memory 
or true, shows that the Tokugawa understand why peasants revolt 
and seek to crush the causes for their discontent in addition to their 
means to stage rebellions.  Corrupt and incompetent daimyo 
threatened the stability of Tokugawa Japan as much as 
Christianity.  In order to avoid revolt and the resultant humiliation, 
daimyo were pressured to practice fair taxation and law. 
 Later daimyo would employ a number of methods for 
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quelling peasant dissent.  Some lords made concessions in order to 
appease the peasantry.  Dete Masamune in Sendai cleverly 
managed to both gain the peasantry’s support for his rule by 
reducing the tax rate while also gaining more control over the 
surplus agricultural production and maximum revenue by 
broadening the tax base.223  In Dete’s case, he avoided pushing the 
peasant population to desperation and his concessions in the tax 
rate kept the populace peaceful.  Simultaneously, he also increased 
his control and revenue from the agricultural farmland.  Other 
lords employed speakers like Hosoi Heishu to pacify their peasant 
populations.  In 1783, Hosoi was hired by the daimyo of Owari to 
mollify the peasantry, angered by poor living conditions worsened 
by a bout of famine.224  Hosoi’s allegorical sermon on the filial 
promise of a young wife to her parents-in-law was intended to 
remind the peasantry of their own duties to their lords and prevent 
any plots of dissent or rebellion against the Owari daimyo.225  The 
sermon was widely popular and drew huge crowds.  In this 
manner, the daimyo were able to broadcast their messages of 
loyalty and moral behavior to a wide peasant population.  Dete’s 
manipulation of the tax base and Hosoi’s sermons illustrate how 
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daimyo after the Shimabara Rebellion worked to pacify their 
peasant populations while also gaining more control over them. 
 The Tokugawa shogunate strived for control over its 
population.  Especially in early years, with the tumultuous Warring 
States years still fresh in the national memory, the shogunate 
believed political domination and unflinching order as the only 
path to peace.  Arguably, the violent methods they employed to 
subdue the peasantry and their daimyo prevented the outbreak of 
an even more destructive and violent war between states.  Driving 
a wedge between the Christians and the rest of Japan, they took 
away the ability for Christianity to become a rallying cry for 
peasant revolt.  Communities would remain divided by “fear of thy 
neighbor,” and could not organize easily or harmoniously.  
Furthermore, the rise of the Zen Buddhist temples as the religious 
arm of the Tokugawa gave them tighter control over the personal 
spiritual lives of its subjects. 226   Soto Zen temples monitored 
parishioners in order to prohibit other religions independent of 
Tokugawa control, especially Christianity and the Nichiren Fuju 
Fuse.227  These temples, much like the constant codes of conduct, 
would advocate for appropriate behavior, knowing one’s place in 
the social hierarchy, and submission to the daimyo and shogunate.  
By demonstrating the penalty for failure, daimyo were pressured to 
                                                          
226 Duncan Ryuken Williams, The Other Side of Zen: A Social History of Soto 
Zen Buddhism in Tokugawa Japan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2005), 23. 
227 Williams, The Other Side of Zen, 20. 
130 
 
minimize corruption and punishment in their domain, or to at least 
formulate methods for placating or subduing the local population.  
Bearable taxation and living conditions deterred many peasants 
from resorting to open rebellion.  The Tokugawa goal was to take 
away both the cause and means of peasant rebellion, in order to 
maintain peace in the realm. 
  Ohashi explored how memory and historical analysis 
influenced the evolving narrative of the Shimabara Rebellion.  In 
early-modern Japan, Christian heresy and disruptive European 
influences were emphasized and the despotism of the Shimabara 
and Amakusa lords was placed in the background. 228   This 
narrative justified, at least in their own eyes, Tokugawa 
shogunate’s harsh persecution of Japanese Christians and their 
expulsion of the Europeans.  As a result, the Christian uprising 
narrative dominated the early Japanese historical accounts and, 
subsequently, the early European historians who used their work.  
However, in later research, more historians recognized how the 
Rebellion also demonstrated a struggle between peasants and lords, 
on the grounds of political terrorism and economic oppression.  
Ohashi contended that later historians focused more on social and 
economic histories, though perhaps too narrowly.229  Though they 
had uncovered another driving cause for the Rebellion, they only 
reordered the causes to place unbearable taxation and punishment 
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as the primary cause and Christianity as a secondary.  In order to 
accurately understand the Shimabara Rebellion, Ohashi asserted 
historians must stop resorting to an “either-or” binary debate.230  
Instead of contesting which cause had more influence, historians 
should attempt to uncover the relationships between Christian 
persecution and economic oppression and how they compounded 
to explode into the Rebellion. 
 The Shimabara Rebellion occurred within a tradition of 
socially cohesive groups of peasants resisting domination by their 
lord.  Influenced by resentment over religious persecution, outrage 
over harsh punishments from the daimyo, and unbearable taxation, 
the Rebellion was a desperate act by a peasantry left with few other 
options to survive.  Due to the strong communal ties between the 
Kyushu peasantry, which included a substantial Japanese Christian 
population, the Rebellion survived for four months and drove the 
lords of Shimabara and Amakusa to humiliation and seppuku.  The 
Tokugawa shogunate’s response shows how these influences were 
all vital to the Rebellion’s success, by trying to remove all these 
factors, including Christianity, the local cultural alliances, and the 
provocative corruption of incompetent daimyo.  Instead of trying 
to simplify the Shimabara Rebellion into a single-storied narrative, 
historians must allow the Rebellion to exist as a complicated 
historical event. 
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